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THE SECURITY VECTORS IN AFRICA
 
Zeferino Cariço André Pintinho1
The African Context
 The analysis of African security has been taking on a crucial role in 
the theoretical and empirical development of the science of African Inter-
national Relations. This intensity is due, in large part, to the growing of the 
so-called “critical” approaches. However, these changes appear in the scope of 
expanding the reach of analysis, but also in introducing an important qualita-
tive leap, regarding the paradigm of the African security vector.
 Even though its positioning in the international context does not 
represent a significant influence regarding economic development, Africa is 
seen as a strategic actor in International Relations in different areas of action.
 Since the African continent is defined as the cradle of mankind, 
scarred from one side by a colonial past imposed by Western powers, that di-
vided and crushed it, leaving it with a heavy colonial legacy, and from the oth-
er side carries in itself the weight of the biggest conflicts balance ever seen in 
the history of humankind, added to the volume of the poverty index, illiteracy, 
chronic diseases and a precarious catalog of political models of governance 
that converted itself into a competition of “dictatorial” political administration 
by most states.
 Even though, 54 African states represent a set as actors of the interna-
tional society, out of which 53 are members of the African Union. They are an 
integral part of a paradigmatic systemic plurality that guide the continent and 
keep it in the context of African security.
 Thus, it can be said that contemporary Africa, in a specific manner, 
“emerged from a group of states delimited by borders created by colonialist 
states for their administrative convenience without considering the ethnic re-
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alities or pre-existing states” (Tshiyembe 2014, 11). In this case, the colonizing 
states treated it, ultimately, as an “empty territory that they partitioned accord-
ing to their interests” (Action 1998, 287).
 Therefore, it continues to be the field of competition among other 
powers and mining and oil companies, but the direct territory occupation has 
disappeared. The competitors and the forms of competition have diversified. 
Under a realist understanding, there is no lasting prosperity without military 
power or strategic influence (Action 1998, 287).
 Under this point of view, the feeble geoeconomic indexes join the fra-
gility of the military indexes (army organization, lack of nuclear and diplomat-
ic weapons, weak relative weight of votes in international organizations) to 
turn African states into less significant powers, secondary or quasi-powers2. 
However, in the context of modernity it is presented with an abysmal devi-
ation of the infrastructures in view of the multiplicity of scarcity of strong 
institutions capable of competing and elevating a different image of the con-
tinent. 
 This colonial activity left underlying damages in the positioning of 
the African continent that was unable to surpass this stage with the formula-
tion of a conscious strategy for development, related to the reordering of the 
world´s new geopolitics. So far, since obtaining autonomy, the fragmentation 
remains unaltered and all attempts of regrouping and creating a huge unity 
resulted in failure.
 Thus, Ruth B. Collier defends that independency represented an ad-
ministrative crisis to the new political leaders, that were confronted with the 
need to consolidate their position through the creation of cohesion among 
different factions of disputing elites and the need to obtain popular support. 
In this context, the multiparty regimes were substituted by single party or 
military regimes that allowed for a better satisfaction of the interests of the 
new African ruling elites (Collier 1982).
 Then, a new identity for establishing a different Africa began to be 
built where “the cultural issues and the history, the fight for wealth and pres-
tige and the vicissitudes related to poverty and resource scarcity contributed to 
the formation of authoritarian models of governance in Africa” (Fatton 1990, 
445).
 While the co-called winners of the War of 1939/45 immediately cre-
ated a requalification project for Europe and developed democratic models as 
societal pacifying instruments, in Africa, a solidarity profile had no effect. The 
2 Power: relational and dynamic concept, that integrates the material resources (army, finan-
ces, population, resources, and immaterial ones (ideology, information) available to the states.
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dream of progress and of infrastructure was materialized into oblivion and 
true abandonment. It began to be disregarded as the cradle of benevolence 
to the continent of the “last thousand million of the poverty” as said by Paul 
Collier (2007, 5).
 It is important to consider the complexity and reach of the recently 
installed regimes. Diamond points out that this is mainly due to the fact, that 
these new regimes faced a weakness State authority, deepened by another 
set of historical and structural obstacles, among which ethnic divisions, the 
weak sense of belonging to the nation, the fragility of the political institutions 
established with little experience, the absence of technical and administrative 
capabilities at the local level, the extreme economic dependence and the revo-
lutionary popular expectancies created by the independence struggles can be 
mentioned. (Diamond 1988, 32).
 However, norms of all kinds were developed, from dictatorship to suc-
cessive coup d’états, to the absence of the rotation of universal suffrage or of 
the political power. Alternatively, and in permanece, the promotion of peace 
and sustainable development, constitute a challenge to African security (Dia-
mond 1988, 32).
 In this context, on one hand unfavorable conditions for democrati-
zation were created and, on the other, favorable ones for the emergence of 
authoritarian regimes in the post-independence African states (Chabal 1999, 
20).
 Almost the whole of sub-Saharan Africa faced similar problems in 
relation to the proposals of nation-states in the republic that formed during 
their emancipations. In a condensed way, Feliz Gaeta observes that: 
With the exception of Mauritius, from Mali to Madagascar, including the 
countries of Western Africa Niger, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sene-
gal, Chad, and the former Belgian Africa, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, the 
countries of Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Comoros and Madagascar, and the countries of Southern Africa Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, South Africa and Angola, as countries, 
are being able to manage their political-parliamentary and liberal systems 
left by their former colonial power although in all this countries there can 
still be verified identical forms of contestation (Gaeta 1994, 713-729).
Since the end of the political pluralism of the beginning of the 1960s, 
several coups d’état occurred in Africa, that created a geostrategic map shaped 
by the Cold War, a factor of destabilization of the wills of the African peoples 
in the building of their models of nation-state and, therefore, “turned the 
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surroundings of the political power into governing States” (Tshiyembe 2014, 
15). 
Effectively, the continent began to be characterized by inescapable 
paradoxes of a system blocked in its transition, marked by some distancing 
between the institutional-normative structure and the concrete materiality; 
by conflicts and tensions between the traditional and the contemporary and 
between the real and the apparent; by the opposition between the charming 
fortress of the “Leviathan”3  and its inherent fragility; and by a bidirectional 
projection of the local and of the external (Cilliers and Dask, 2013).
This image of Africa is justified, among other reasons, because the 
same paradigms that legitimized the slave trade and the European coloniza-
tion, still reside in the thinking of many scholars of those sciences (Hugon 
2009).
However, Gilberto Veríssimo examines this anachronistic context as 
the result of factors considered of:
[..] archetypes, spread by the most relevant international media and gener-
ally presenting the African peoples as: the barbarian, the inferior against 
which is necessary to protect or whom is necessary to civilize, importing 
the benefits of the revealed religions, of the science and of the institutions; 
the child, that must be educated, behind in the evolution of humankind, 
before which the motherland has an educational role, or that is not yet 
ready for democracy; the noble savage, of the “superior” that lives in caring 
communities, in harmony with nature, and must be preserved; the broth-
er, our equal, with whom it is necessary to cooperate; the foreign that we 
cannot comprehend and whose difference makes us, in the last case, indif-
ferent; the chained slave that must be freed from its owner and its bonds; 
or the poor that requires assistance or help to develop (Veríssimo 2013, 30).
 The way Gilberto Veríssimo theorizes the fulcrum of the African im-
age is indeed interesting, with peculiarity of its instrumentalization. In this 
attractive analysis by Gilberto it is interesting to us to stress the role of the 
media of the main international agencies that contradict power management 
in Africa and its underdevelopment index, characterized as insufficient to ex-
press the current paradigm of modern times. The image defined as vision or 
perception of Africa remains in the respective consciousness necessary relat-
ed to a true representation of the African reality.
3 Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, 
commonly called the Leviathan, is a book written by Thomas Hobbes and published in 1651. 
The title refers the biblical Leviathan.
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This conflicted scenario, added to the endemic underdevelopment of 
some regions and countries in Africa, accentuates the frailty of the states and 
societies themselves, representing a greater challenge to lasting peace, sus-
tainable development and human rights, situations that risk the accomplish-
ment of the Development Objectives of this continent in the current millen-
nium (Nação e Defesa 2012, 6).
However, it is not strange that the security issues more autochthonous 
to Africa, even though similar to those of other region, are added, through the 
global connection projected over the continent, to the great security issues 
from the world and a panoply of questions covered by its expanded concept 
(Moller 2009).
Currently, these issues cover not only the traditional security of the 
state regarding its counterparts, but also the security of its citizens, many 
times forcing them to counter one vector with another as a way to prevent the 
damages each could cause4.
However, when African people states, in its saying, that even “as hot 
as the fountain waters are, they do not cook your rice”, it articulates with 
shocking simplicity a fundamental principle of physics as well as a political 
science one. We are aware that the guidance of development of a dynamic 
event, whatever its external constraints are, depends mainly on its internal 
characteristics to transform its own reality, based on its concrete knowledge 
and its own efforts and sacrifices (Cabral 2008, 174).
In fact, the geostrategic insertion of African security appeals to an ar-
ticulation between the internal and external options of cooperation, which is 
translated into the development of relations with the neighboring countries 
and the strategic partners.
In view of the series of varied and incalculable conflicts in a dissimilar 
political and cultural argument, the attempt to build a security policy that 
justifies the mobilization of individuals and means raises debates on their 
political, legal and moral bases that allow to sustain action and lead to some 
measure of success beyond the subjective analysis of the advantages of pacifi-
cation and security. That, for instance, is not clearly shared by those who are 
part of the conflicts or so ingrained in a dynamic of violence, that they cannot 
perceive any way out. (Nação e Defesa 2012, 16).
Admiral A. Sanguinetti recognizes that the fusion of internal and ex-
ternal antagonism generates confusion about the legitimate concerns of de-
4 See the perspective adopted and the themes stressed in William, Paul. 2008. Security Stu-
dies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, and in the classic study by Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, 
and Jaap de Wilde. 1997. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
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fense and security, about the responsibilities of the army and the police, thus 
causing the progressive transformation of the police forces into armies, and 
forming, at the same time, armies meant to intervene internally, violating its 
normal ethics, under the excuse of the defense of the nation (Sanguintetti 
1985, 498).
In other terms, by associating the national security to the promotion 
of this nefarious doctrine at the systemic level of fundamental values, African 
power lost track of intelligences, patriotisms and intense devotions (Tshiyem-
be 2014, 19).
For decades, the harvesting of violence and death could be seen. In 
other words, the perception that makes violence a declared norm of individ-
uals and groups and that functions as an addiction, now and foremost, to 
justify the need for for a despotic governance, through force, to the political 
and social stabilization and the contention of conflicts, a horizon that people 
exhausted by catastrophes and violence, and, we dare say, the prevalence of 
belligerent discourses and attitudes. (Nação e Defesa 2012, 16).
The attempt to understand current reality, allows one to agree with the 
argument of some theorists that the central problem relies on the state in Af-
rica. The application of the theoretical conceptions of the state to Africa posed 
issues that blocked the place of the continent in the theory of International 
Relations (Veríssimo 2014, 31).
The question of the neo-patrimonial state, of the debility of civil socie-
ty, that was characterized during the debates of the post-independence period, 
overall during the 1980s/90s, until the question of the governance regime of 
the 2000s provoked serious issues to states in Africa. It influenced the im-
plication on how to understand the theories of African international relations 
and the place they occupy (Veríssimo 2014, p.31).
In this context, the efficacy of the whole African regional security sys-
tem is affected by the frailty of the state and the lack of legitimacy of many 
rulers, bringing as consequences the excessive use of means of social control, 
disseminated corruption in many groups of society, incapacity of providing 
goods and basic services, such as health, education, social security and hous-
ing, stagnation of the economies, without any perspective of evolution and 
creation and distribution of riches; and sometimes, appropriation of the pub-
lic structure by ethnic, political or economic factions (Delgado 2016, 329).
Definitely, it is this structural and institutionalized insecurity that the 
post-colonial state classifies as national security, in the absence of the creation 
of conditions for an objective security, defining as “a confident and calm state 
of spirit resulting from a countries capacity of using force to repress a foreign 
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aggression and also to promote civil peace and national concord thanks to the 
satisfaction of political, economic, social and cultural needs of the citizens, 
including the physical protection of men and their belongings and the guar-
antee of the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the men and 
citizens” (Robert 1985, 265).
However, according to Luís Saraiva (2010, 106), “the threats to the 
African security may be reduced if its countries in greater risk search for the 
path of development. For that, security structures are necessary, capable of 
guaranteeing the minimum conditions to the success of the development 
programs”.
Nevertheless, the vulnerability of some of the most fragile African 
countries is reflected, still in accordance to the author, “in their incapacity 
to face the drug trafficking networks, the scarcity of naval means to oppose 
the clandestine migration networks and to protect the riches of their waters, 
and also in the difficulty to succeed in adapting their laws and systems to the 
monitoring and combat of the terrorist phenomenon, preventing them from 
collaborating with greater efficiency in the international community’s combat 
efforts” (Saraiva 2010, 106).
Even though, it is considered that the security and defense paradigm 
are one of the most important fronts on which Africa will have to make efforts 
for its development, both in relation to the African military capabilities, to 
the technical-military level, and to, in general, the capabilities in the scope of 
peacekeeping and security. In this way, a number of theorists, as well as ana-
lysts and politicians, have been unanimous in the idea that those are far from 
the needs of Africa (Saraiva 2010, 107).
We can consider that historical factors, such as the decolonization pro-
cesses, the Cold War, the crises and the civil wars that followed the fall of the 
Berlin Wall were factors that created obstacles to the development of the mili-
tary capabilities in sync with world processes (Saraiva 2010, 107).
In this sense, it allowed that the frailty observed in the African insti-
tutions, spread even to the African Union. Considered the biggest political 
center of the continent, it was seen as an institution without much prestige 
in the level of the continent itself, representing a number of problems of both 
material and organizational order.
In this context, it can be considered that after the bipolar period, the 
African continent lost its relevance, the military advisors and specialists aban-
doned the region and the military means and financial help started to decline. 
Politically, since the independence from their European colonial managers, 
Africa brings to our mind the idea of civil wars, famine, generalized corrup-
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tion, incapable governments, coup d’états and human rights violations (Thak-
er 2006, 10).
According to Augusto Trindade (2006, 7), “the limited development of 
the African military capabilities is directly linked to the issues of development 
in Africa”.
Although he considers that the signals of rupture in Africa are posi-
tive, and that many countries benefited from foreign debt forgiveness in the 
most recent years, and also that the year of 2005 was dedicated to the accom-
plishment of the Millennium Development Objectives, the truth is that Africa 
failed to achieve these same goals by 2015. So, “the next years will continue 
to struggle against some contradictions: between the marginalization and 
the political emergence; between the global recovery and the failure of many 
states; and between the opposing trends of reducing conflicts or dealing with 
the shadow of their continuity” (Trindade 2006, 7).
It is the instability that spreads through most of the continent that can 
bring forward a discussion over the pacification efforts, of democratization 
and of economic recovery in the respective regions (Trindade 2006, 8).
From this point of view, it is considered that without peace, without 
the exercise of democracy by the states, it will be difficult to look at the dream 
of integration, of a united Africa, characterized as one United States of Africa.
In this scope, the rebuilding of the state, of the institutions, and the 
overall increase of the human capital is imperious, as we are dealing with 
states on the verge of failing because of war, or for having recently left highly 
destructive conflicts.
In order to fight against systemic debilities, one of the greatest pri-
orities must be the correct mobilization and management of the resources 
available in the continent then. In this sense, the first priority must be the 
establishment of peace and security, because the economy can only thrive in 
environments free of crisis or war (Trindade 2006, 11).
Another priority is related to the investment on human capital through 
the professional capacitation, through schooling and the promotion of the 
health sector (Trindade 2006, 11).
The dialectic of political power in Africa
 One of the most relevant issues that is being discussed in the context 
of Africa International Relations, is the interdependence of the security vector 
previously analyzed. It assimilates the policy patterns of governance of the 
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African “political” man, as if the answer to find extraordinary solutions to the 
problems of the continent were in the same exact measure as the concentra-
tion of its command. Constantly, the issue of power in Africa receives spe-
cial relevance in concealed local zones of conflict, mainly in areas of current 
added strategic value, in which one can notice a proliferation of regional and 
intrastate conflicts, leading to a serious structural underdevelopment and, to a 
certain measure, to the failure of the states that lead them (Bernardino 2001, 
133).
 Following the emancipations, that led the states to political uniform-
ity, but not to their citizens liberty and citizenship, African leaders suppressed 
the divergences, ruling in a despotic, if not cruel, way.
 Therefore, “instead of being the will of the people that creates and le-
gitimates power, it is force that creates power, legitimating it and engendering 
the will of the people” (Tshiyembe 2014, 18). The incapacity or impossibility 
to coexist with adversity led to conflicts. It could be said that this was the incli-
nation of the leaders in face of the covert obstacles and the cultural heteroge-
neity.
 Originated from unequal institutions, this diversity resulted in differ-
ent understandings of values and laws, and of procedures and rights related to 
the human life. However, these anathemas of the conquered power, continue 
to be exclusive property of their owners, even though they are not shared and 
have no tendency to change their holder (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).
 The fierceness of this reality, raised the challenge of the rulers to a 
current model according to which “the ideal is the preservation of power, and 
such preservation became the main national interest, if not the only one” 
(Tshiyembe 2014, 18).
 Thus, since then, according to the view of the rulers, the highest ob-
jective of the state is neither economic and social development, nor the na-
tional unity, but power (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).
 In our perspective, this security ideology leads to national insecurity, 
since it considers political power as the only constitutive component of the 
State and a fundamental condition for social peace and national harmony.
 In this way, even if in a purely empirical way, the same author adds 
that, this truth is applied as the result of two motives, in which the first “lays 
the African power as a dialectic relation of external dependence that escapes 
the control of the post-colonial state” (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).
 In the second place, the “true enemy, if not the exclusive one of Afri-
can power, is not this hypothetical external enemy, so vilified. The true enemy 
of African power is effectively the organized people, refusing to grant its po-
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litical legitimacy” (Tshiyembe 2014, 19).
 Defending the same idea, George Balandier presents his theory craft-
ed from the power and image of domination in Africa, in a generic way, com-
paring the power with the theatrical assembly. And characterizes Africa in 
this way:
In Africa, there is an image that conveys power. In my book, Le pouvoir en 
scéne, I intend to show how the political is constantly fabricating its own 
image to exert what is called power… There is an author (a poorly known 
one) that makes some notes regarding Shakespeare’s proposed concept of 
theatrical drama (…) that suggest that beyond regimes or specific consti-
tutions (…) there is one commonality in all regimes, the «mise en scéne», 
the geo-theatrical regime: the true regime is that politics are also actors…. 
The political order favors the representation of images (…) This is the case 
of traditional power, therefore powers are potentially images (…) there is a 
scenario and the actors play a role, in which the famous, and the political, 
are present, (…) and it is cyclical. (…) It is the case of Benin, where the sov-
ereign dies, it is said: darkness has fallen over the country, justice, order, 
has disappeared […] Thus, the need to reestablish light, justice or order […] 
There is a whole structure, a machinery, whose actors intervene to reestab-
lish the lost light or order (Balandier 1989, 19).
 By bringing more complexity to the analysis of this political circum-
stance of Africa, we can consider that all repressive forces (or most of them), 
namely, the army, the guard, the police, the popular militias and the secret 
services, are created, trained, equipped and financed by eastern and western 
countries, these foreign powers have both the ability to protect the power, to 
destabilize it, or yet to invert it, in service of its own main national interests 
(Bernardino 2001, 133).
 The battalion chief Le Seigneur uses the same kind of argument: 
“These armies materialize new sovereignties in enormous spaces, sovereign-
ties over which it is necessary to inflict political orientation, and that play a 
fundamental role in the survival of their acting rulers, or those who believe 
to be their rulers. These Lilliputian organs are then revealed to be essential 
political forces of black Africa, which must be controlled” (Guillermin 1979, 
8).
 The political power, as a manifestation of public force, and whose 
prerogatives the colonial authorities had used, affected African leaders even 
more deeply. In this scope, the idea of political power as a common good did 
not take root in the minds of the leaders of humankind. In contrast, it was 
understood as the force of a man or a group that imposes its world conception 
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to the whole of the society it governs (Tshiyembe 2014, 26).
 This politization of differences may seem, at first sight, incoherent 
or contradictory with the fact that many African leaders defend as their first 
task the development of a national unity and an idea of standardization to the 
building of the Nation. However, these are processes that happen simultane-
ously and are interconnected (Ferreira 2014, 18).
 However, as perceived by P. F. Gonidec, this everyday reality does not 
mitigate the constitutional democratic appearances that proclaim the princi-
ple according to which the “sovereignty belongs to the people” (Gonidec 1983, 
70).
 As an example, the constitution of Gabon declares the institution of 
the “government of the people, by the people and for the people (article 2nd)”. 
Profitable in the same sense, the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau stresses that 
the national sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau resides in the peo-
ple (article 2nd) (Constituições 1986, 145). While the Nigerian constitution in-
dicates that the people has the power to define the rules of the political game 
by the adoption of a constitution, the supreme law of the state (article 1st of 
the Constitution of 1979).
 Within a context of expressive long-term perspectives, it can be ob-
served that African constitutions are seen as mere paperwork in accordance 
to the political will of the group in power at that time.
 In this way, Y. Faure proves that, the constitution is not established 
with the intent of simplifying power in accordance with the will of the people 
or the of the diverse juridical or intellectual fictions underlying it (the nation, 
the country, the homeland, the common good, the general interest). But it is 
exercised in order to immobilize the political functions, of the definitive loca-
tion of agents in the relation […] (Faure 1981, 34).
 The African constitution is a technic of political supremacy, as stated 
by the “lifelong holder of the power” (that must last through the life of one 
person, and not beyond it). When, because of crises, the military take over 
power, they do not demand the free consent of the people to exercise it. They 
assume that it is in a childish condition and decide to replace it, alleging that 
their revolts were dictated by the will to protect the people against the violence 
of the overthrown rulers (Faure 1981, 35).
 However, the difficulties to deal with the social asymmetry and het-
erogeneity derive from the dysfunctions and conflicts in the core of the state, 
overtaken by groups and actors, who would be important to identify and 
name. Without it one could speak endlessly about the predatory role of the 
states, while it loses significance. On the other hand, pragmatically, to identify 
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the owners of the state, ethnic chiefs or of any other affiliation or allegiance, 
may force a dialogue with them in order to achieve a possible commitment in 
the built of policies to prevent conflicts (Nascimento 1992, 20).
 These questions lead us back to the problems of the political archi-
tecture in Africa. In a viable time frame, projects of political integration or 
refoundation in Africa will probably not erase the states and the national iden-
tities created in the period. For some time, however, states will be, mostly, the 
external link that works against the closer interdependence with the social 
fabric. The development and protection of this social fabric is, and should 
have been, its main commitment. (Nascimento 1992, 22).
 This is the framework in which the management of political power in 
Africa is idealized: it figures out as a mere utopic instrument in defining the 
partition of security, that benefits some and not others, marginalized from 
the process of political values distribution and the recognition of internal con-
flicts, that bring a deep division all over Africa.
The Action of the Organization of African Unity on the Security 
in Africa
The creation of the African Unity, in 2002, was an important step 
change the pattern of action in the landscape of African conflicts and to aban-
don the rigid conception of sovereignty and no intervention defended by the 
predecessor Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Thus, the African Union defends a more interventionist regime of a 
regional organization, affirming in its constitutive act the right of interven-
tion in grave circumstances, which include war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity (African Union 2000).
In this context, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity of 
1963 did not include a well-developed mechanism of collective security, de-
spite being considered one of the Security Council’s collaborating regional 
organizations in matters of regional peace and security (Delgado 2016, 326).
Although one cannot argue that these juridical limitations were the 
cause of the three types of conflicts that erupted in Africa before the end of the 
Cold War (namely intestate conflicts, internal and anticolonial ones), on the 
long run the main contribution of the OAU was precisely the positive support 
it provided to the concretization of the national liberation processes (Dugard 
1967). It remained conservative in the matters related to intervention in inter-
nal affairs, adopting an almost absolute non-intervention principle (Murithi 
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2005), and ineffective in the resolution of the regional conflicts.
However, it is observed that security in Africa is considered, by almost 
everyone, a strategic priority, for without security there is no sustainable de-
velopment. Not the classic security of the state or its organizations, but the 
“real” security dimension, felt by and focused on the human person5. Such 
dimension abandons the stereotyped concept of identity of national security, 
focused on the state, and replaces it for that of human security, focused on the 
societies, in the populations and the human beings (Bernardino 2008, 80).
This new paradigm of human security is seen as the one comprising 
multiple security issues, that affect the world´s peace and security, defined as:
Human security means to protect fundamental freedoms. It means to pro-
tect people from critical and omnipresent threats and situations. It means 
to use processes based on the people’s qualities and aspirations. It means 
to create political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural 
systems that can together guarantee the bases for the survival, sustenance 
and dignity of people (United Nations 2003, 4).
The concept of security reaches in this way a third dimension6 that 
comes to prioritize the human population as object, widening the scope of 
the application of collective security7, and includes an even greater number of 
situations in the list of threats to international peace and security.
The African capabilities also face a varied group of challenges, among 
which the materialization of the AU’s new plans related to African peace and 
security can be highlighted. These challenges represent an important part of 
the weaknesses Africa must learn to overcome (Saraiva 2014, 108).
Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, initially called Or-
ganization of the African Unity, in its 3rd article, called “Objectives”, in the 
subheading f, states that it is the obligation of the signatory countries of the 
5 Human security consists in the way as the people lives and breathes in a society that freely 
makes their own various choices and has access to the market and social opportunities.
6 Considering that, up until now, there were three dimensions of the security concept the 
history of the contemporary world: a first traditional view that was limited to the protection 
of the territory of a state against external military threats ⸻known as the national security (see 
Kelsen, Hans. 1957. Collective Security under International Law. Washington: United States 
Government Office); a second notion that, as we have already demonstrated, through the deve-
lopment of a collective security system, transformed a limiting definition of the concept of state 
sovereignty into an idea of international security; and, lastly, the coming of sustainable human 
security, the last stage of development of the concept, and adopted by the UN in its last official 
documents and operational strategy that followed.
7 These principles were already defined in the directives of the Responsibility to Protect.
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Constitutive Act of the African Union “to promote peace, security and stabili-
ty in the Continent” (African Union 2000).
This new model of security was developed to grant higher protection 
and consistency level, close to the populations, for these are constantly affect-
ed by the many regional conflicts.
Luís Bernardino defends the need to adopt an understanding of se-
curity that surpasses the security of the state, focusing on the security of the 
individual, the person, and creating security systems that directly protect the 
populations (Bernardino 2008, 81). That leads us to stress that the interven-
tion of the human security constitutes the nuclear core of stability of any na-
tion.
Couto Lemos apud Saraiva (2014, p. 179) states that “the security and 
development processes must be intimately connected, for one depends on the 
other. If security is not omnipresent, if citizens notice, people will be more 
inclined to accept the entrance of stabilizing factors for it to be an acquired 
condition”.
Focusing in the interests of the African security, the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union, in its 4th article (Principles) of the same document, 
in the subheading “e” through “j” alerts for the need to create means for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through 
appropriate means that must be decided by the Conference of the Union (e); 
prohibits the use or the threat to use force among member states of the Un-
ion (f); declares that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in 
accordance with a decision of the Conference in grave situations, namely war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (h); defends the pacific coex-
istence of member states of the Union and their right to exist in peace and 
security and to seek help, through the AU Conference, as well as the right of 
non-interference through a member state in the internal affairs of another 
member state (i) as well as the right of the member states to require the in-
tervention of the Union, aiming to reestablish peace and security (j) (African 
Union 2000).
In this sense, it is understood that these fundamental principles of the 
African Union, in the account of peace and security for the African continent, 
provided for the creation of juridical or political norms or instruments, such 
as the cases of the (Delgado 2016, 326):
• Protocol that establishes the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
(2002) (Gumedze 2011, 327);
• Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense (2005);
• African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance 
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(2007);
• Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977);
• African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (1996);
• Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999);
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981);
• Regional instruments on the protection of refugees (1969), chil-
dren (1990), women (2003), youth (2006) and internally displaced 
persons (2009).
In the same line, the regional instruments of promotion of economic 
integration do not falter to justify this presence, through the creation of the 
African Economic Community (1991), combat to corruption (2003), promo-
tion of public service values (2011), and the one related to the protection of the 
African culture(s) (2006) (Gumedze 2011, 327).
Stephan Klingebiel, a German political scientist specializing in mat-
ters of development in Africa developed by himself how the dynamics cur-
rently involved with foreign assistance in Africa is in large scale related to the 
military capabilities (Klingebiel 2007, 71).
The institutions created in Africa or by the international community 
have not been competent or have not had sufficient will to military intervene 
in situations of extreme emergence to protect the civilian populations (Klinge-
biel 2007, 71).
However, many doubts were expressed on the reason of being of some 
military actions, and the motives that led to military initiatives and actions by 
foreign actors in Africa. Thus the reason for the main problems of the former 
African organization, the “OAU”, which would be derived of the inhibiting 
principles of sovereign equality and the non-interference on the affairs of oth-
er member states (Klingebiel 2007, 71).
Nicolle Gnesotto8, a specialist in African security, defends that “the 
growing poverty in Africa is seen as one of the gravest phenomenon, consti-
tuting itself as an obstacle to the combat of the weakness of the African capa-
bilities in matters of peace and security. And, in truth, without a strong state, 
capable of taking over the regulatory functions, the African countries will not 
be able to escape the economic fragility” (Gnesotto 2017, 17).
However, Charles Goerens stresses that the built or rebuilt of this ca-
pacity of providing peace and security should not be a synonymous of exces-
8 Nicolle Gnesotto was the director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies be-
tween 2002 and 2007.
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sive bureaucracy (Goerens 2007). Such a scenario contributes to a regional 
system with inefficiency indexes still not sufficient to guarantee the conti-
nent’s security through the African Union.
Said Djinnit, Algerian ambassador and politician, when he was the 
acting Commissioner to the Peace and Security of the Commission of the 
African Union (AU), stated, as his opinion, before the parliamentarians of the 
WEU, in a plenary session in December 2005, that “the new determination il-
lustrated the ambitions of the continent, but also the limits of what Africa can 
do. In other words, alone it did not have the human resources necessary to the 
execution of this immense peace and security mandate”, he stated, referring 
to the challenge of Africa conducting its own destiny (Assembly of Western 
European Union 2005).
It can be noted that one of the greatest issues the African continent 
continues to face is the attempt to consolidate peace and security. In this 
sense, we can affirm that African states must seek to uphold and support 
its actions in the recommendations and resolutions adopted on the summits 
of the African Union, the Executive Councils, the Specialized Committees, 
which, in the present case, are the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, as well as the African Regional Organizations, political, economic and 
military (Gnesotto 2007, 17).
In spite of its weakness, the African Union fits in a context of relative 
stability and learning, and is still considered the main regional organization 
of the African continent. Despite being in a context of clearly and permanent 
ongoing armed conflicts, that coexist with a number of current instability 
situations, the security theme in the African continent is being highlighted 
(Gnesotto 2007, 17).
Because of this, it is observed that despite the AU’s constant efforts 
and its specialized committees, the political-military peace and security in the 
continent constitute an apathetic embryonic tool, allowing to the projecting of 
some scenarios that facilitate the predisposition to conflict, in which the func-
tioning of institutional schools of prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts become core, aiming an approach that is at the same time preventive 
and simultaneously has capabilities for the management and resolution of 
crises (Gnesotto 2007).
However, the future of global action of African security will be based 
on methods of strategic revision founded on successful practices, more than 
in the creation of new security functions or new military capabilities that are 
often created to protect certain groups.
In this way, despite the fact that some of the security problems that 
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affect the continent do not constitute conventional and direct threats to its 
continental counterparts or to the international security, the internal conflicts 
and the reduced territorial control capabilities, on one side, and the corrup-
tion and financial fragility of the state, on the other, make it able to become a 
problem with potential externalization risks, and that poses a direct threat to 
the security of its neighbors, through the indirect promotion of people’s flight 
to border states to conflict zones or the acceptance of the use of its territory as 
base for criminals or political-military groups hostile to a third party (Delgado 
2016, 324).
Final Considerations
 The dialectic of the comprehension of the security vector, which we 
inferred in this paper, constitutes an unprecedented issue for the African con-
tinent. It puts into evidence that the efficacy of the entire African regional 
security system is affected by the frailty of the state and the absence of legit-
imacy of many rulers, with the consequent use of excessive means of social 
control, widespread corruption in a number of sectors of the society, lack of 
ability to provide basic health, education, social security and housing goods 
and services, stagnant economies without perspectives of evolution and cre-
ation and distribution of riches; and at times the appropriation of the public 
structure by ethnic, political or economic factions (Delgado 2016, 329).
 However, all these aspects contribute to a regional system with effi-
ciency indexes still too low to guarantee security in the continent. In this way, 
the ambitious mechanisms planned and the robustness they possess in com-
parison to the universal system cannot still be fully explored for a number of 
reasons, as stated by Delgado (2016, 331), “related to the availability of finan-
cial and logistical-military means, the hesitant support to the grandiloquent 
and progressive values and principles, organizational issues, lack of economic 
articulation, natural particular national and strategic interests, among oth-
ers”.
 Another fundamental aspect, which is related to the surprising para-
dox of the security vector in Africa, resides in the fact that it is not the will of 
the people that creates and legitimates power; instead, it is force that creates 
power, legitimates it, and fabricates the will of the people (Tshiyembe 2014, 
112). Thus, security is characterized as fragile, scarce, because of the failure to 
follow the norms created by the constitutions to an effective management.
 Thus, the power obtained in this way remains a private property of its 
holders, is not shared, and does not contemplate a change of owner; it can be 
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perceived that in a certain way it is a key vector of the political violence in the 
continent, among other factors.
 Despite this, the negative chain reaction of the phenomena in the po-
litical space led us to define the post-colonial state as an autocratic and feudal 
power of a monarchic tendency that, however, rules over a slave republic and 
whose goodbye is configured in a utopia.
 In relation to the small contribution on the African Union, it is visible 
that its remarkable inefficiency is, ironically, criticized by the member states, 
sometimes with an excess of naivety. Effectively, it is curious to observe that a 
number of African Heads of State ignored that the AU represented an inter-
governmental organization and that, in this sense, its field of action is limited 
by the powers that member states grant it.
 However, it is the same to say that these member states still had not 
yet understood that they are, themselves, the agents of this paralysis, and that 
despite what they say or do, the failure of the AU represents their own failure. 
Thus, it is necessary that the continent creates a combination of the wills and 
actions of the individuals with the aim to pursue determined objectives or to 
accomplish certain ends in order to obtain the urgent change into a new para-
digm. It is necessary that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
be activated with special determination, having it been elaborated based on 
the structures, objectives, principles, values, decision making processes in 
matters of prevention, administration and resolution of crises and conflicts, 
post-conflict rebuilding and development in the continent, as well as the Pro-
tocol related to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union9, which describes the many components of the APSA and its 
respective responsibilities to make it a more present organization in the lead-
ing of the continent.
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ABSTRACT
Since the early times, security has always been a permanent feature, a fundamental 
condition and a concern of people living in society. However, in seeking this goal, 
people have established alliances, agreements, partnerships and multiple forms of 
cooperation to solve their specific security problems, which in certain historical con-
texts were decisive for the course of their own history and for the survival of societies. 
In this context, the African continent presents itself as the cradle of mankind, where 
the level of insecurity qualifies as critical, which in our opinion allowed studying the 
vectors of these events. In turn, we try to articulate and explain in the light of African 
International Relations, the strategic vectors that embody a differentiated approach to 
security in Africa, revealing the roots of the problems that plague the continent, scru-
tinizing the situation, identifying the constraints and threats before bringing a set of 
proposals for the solution of various problems that arise on the continent.
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